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Abstract
This paper examines the question of how conventional understanding
of inflation relates to stickiness. Several results that often go unnoticed
are re-examined.
1 Examining equations
Suppose that economy has constant natural real interest rate rt,n = r all the
time. For exposition, I will assume that even under a sticky price model, rt = r.
This assumption is indeed restrictive, but this will not damage the analysis. Let
Taylor rule be,
it = r + φpipit + φy y˜t (1)
where y˜t is output gap, pit is inflation rate.
By the Fisher equation,
it = r + Et [pit+1] (2)
Combining two and assuming φy = 0, as in [1],
Et [pit+1] = φpipit (3)
If equilibrium real variables are unaffected by pit alone, then one may say that
while real explosions are ruled out by some conditions, nominal explosions can-
not be ruled out and thus Equation 3 allows explosive solutions. Unless pit = 0,
any expected path explodes if |φpi| > 1, as [1] says.
Now introduce New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), which assumes some
degree of price stickiness:
pit = βEt [pit+1] + κy˜t (4)
Substituting the equation into Equation 3,
y˜t =
(1− βφpi)pit
κ
(5)
• If βφpi = 1, then y˜t = 0 at every t. Ruling out real variable explosions
does not rule out nominal explosions.
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• If |φpi| > 1 but βφpi 6= 1, then either pit = 0 at every t which ensures y˜t = 0
at every t, or y˜t explodes. If real variable explosions are to be always ruled
out, then |φpi| > 1 ensures pit = 0, y˜t = 0.
• If |φpi| < 1, then real variable explosions are avoided always. But nominal
variable explosions cannot be ruled out by ruling out real variable ex-
plosions. Under the standard consumption Euler equation, an additional
constraint is created, thus rules out nominal and real explosions.
Thus, this gives us another type of divine coincidence - if 0 < β < 1 and assum-
ing that real explosions are eliminated automatically, then just setting |φpi| > 1
is consistent with completely eliminating sticky price distortions. While NKPC
is only an approximation, its validity stands, as it is approximated around zero
inflation steady state. Monetary policy is basically invisible. Thus, there is no
need in this theoretical economy to adjust interest rate based on output gap
and doing so only complicates the matter by creating an unnecessary business
cycle.
The problem now is this: as demonstrated above, now the theory of inflation
relies on existence of some type of stickiness that allows one to affect real vari-
ables by nominal variable changes. Here, y˜t is affected by pit. Thus, ruling out
explosion of y˜t allows one to rule out explosion of pit, even without the standard
consumption Euler equation.
But in an economy that does not allow real variables to be affected by nominal
variable changes, such an understanding cannot be used to rule out explosion
of pit.
This now brings the question of faith: one may believe that there must be one
rule/unified interpretation that allows how inflation rate or price level is de-
termined for both flexible/frictionless and price-sticky or any sticky economies.
Some others may believe that different rules can apply for frictionless and flex-
ible economies. I will examine the former only.
For the former belief, one possible stance may be that “Standard New Keyne-
sian theory of inflation is invalid.” This stance would argue that there is no
way to reconcile the equations into providing unique inflation path for a flexi-
ble economy. The following classical logic argument follows independent of the
stance.
banning real explosions is valid→ NK understanding of inflation is valid
By “banning real explosions is valid,” it is meant that selection of a unique
equilibrium by eliminating real-explosive equilibria is always valid, provided the
model is consistent. Then assuming the model is true, “NK understanding of
inflation is valid.”
The aforementioned stance states that this understanding is invalid even if the
model is true. Thus, a believer in this stance must be ready to say that obtaining
a unique equilibrium by banning real explosions may not always be a valid way.
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1.1 Can real explosion elimination be justified?
In any case, New Keynesian models need real explosion elimination to obtain
a unique equilibrium. But why would an agent wish to have non-explosive
equilibrium? The reason may be found on utility based on consumption-leisure
tradeoff. Since actual labor quantity equilibrium depends on the specification
of supply side, one cannot generalize completely, but it is in general safe to say
that keeping magnitude of output gap under a certain bound is a welfare-wise
good idea. The question then is whether the agents have power to enforce the
hope as part of equilibrium selection. The households in general are constrained
by the supply side too, so it is natural to say that there must be expectation
that central bank can control output gap and inflation. But there is nothing in
the model that justifies such an expectation.
1.2 Is |φpi| > 1 a threat to explode the economy if a target
equilibrium is not met?
Cochrane in [1] argues that setting |φpi| > 1 for Et [pit+1] = φpipit amounts to
central bank ensuring nominal uniqueness by promising to explode the nominal
economy if pit does not turn out to be the unique inflation rate obtained after
elimination procedures. But as Cochrane says,
pit+1 = φpipit + δt+1 (6)
where δt+1 can be any arbitrary random variable with Etδt+1 = 0. In many
rational expectation models, an agent is forward-looking - thus, it is Etpit+1
that affects pit, not pit affecting Etpit+1. After pit is decided, it is mainly sunspot
δt+1 that decides pit+1. This sunspot reflects the fact that expectation of future
inflation is not anchored. Thus, even if |φpi| > 1, there is no reason to state
that the economy would necessarily go explosive if the target equilibrium is
not met. After all, δt+1 can go negative by future agents’ expectations joining
with central bank expectations, if the private sector expectation previously was
for explosive path with continuously positive inflation. δt+1 after all was only
expected to be zero given the information at time t. And δt depends only on
information at time t. That pit is not the target inflation rate reflects the fact
that the household/firms expectation for pit+1 was different from the central
bank’s forecast. If this discrepancy can be eliminated, then even if the economy
started out with the gap, the nominal economy will not explode.
Thus, the actual problem again is whether central bank can make the agents
believe that it has control over pit.
Also, Equation 3 involves the expectation of firms, which are connected to
the representative household expectations. In the model, central bank expec-
tations do not appear, and all one has is a monetary policy rule that honors
private sector equilibrium. New Keynesian models are driven by demand, and
this demand expectation plays a fundamental role in an economy. All central
bank can do is trying to shape that household expectation, which channels into
firms’ expectation. This demand-led behavior means that the household is fully
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knowledgeable about consequences. In this case, can we really say that the
private sector is “wrong” about its expectation?
2 Conclusion
It is also known that if price level has floor and ceiling and with it ≥ 0, then
explosive solutions leading up to price floor/ceiling may be eliminated. Thus,
all the aforementioned discussions may rely on the space of price level not being
constrained. One can, as Cochrane in [1] argues, justify the space of price level
not being constrained by hyperinflation episodes in history, but whether this is
justifiable remains outside the scope of this paper.
To summarize, what matters in the end is whether central bank and agents can
agree on expected future inflation rate and output gap. As learning mechanism
is missing from the model, one is still left with possibility of exploding real and
nominal equilibria. And if justification of ruling out explosive real equilibria is
made, then at least in simple New Keynesian models, one loses the reason to
set φy other than zero, since |φpi| > 1 can fix inflation rate to zero and output
gap to zero.
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